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Abstract 
The ongoing rise of inequality and the outbreak of the economic crisis since 2008 have fueled the 
debate about the effects of macro-economic processes on democracy in general, and on political 
participation in particular. Whereas the effect of economic disparity is well documented in the 
literature, the implications of the economic downturn have not been sufficiently evaluated so far. 
The article addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive overview of the impact of these macro-
economic factors on individual political participation in Europe. Using data from the first six rounds 
of the European Social Survey (ESS), it shows that income inequality reduces participation and 
enlarges the participatory gap between better- and worse-off. In contrast, economic contraction has 
no effect on the overall level of participation and makes the poor participate more and the rich less.  
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1. Introduction 
Rising inequality and the recent economic downturn have renewed scholarly attention in the effects 
of macro-economic conditions on democracy. Despite the fact that democracy is essentially a 
political revolution, rather than an economic one (Przeworski 2008) and that it has no "intrinsic 
association with (...) the private realm of the economic market" (Bermeo 2012, 16), scholars are 
concerned about the vitality and stability of democracy under conditions of widening disparities and 
economic crisis (e.g. Thomassen 1989; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). One way of looking at this is to 
evaluate the effect of these conditions on citizen participation. Few doubts exist about the 
importance of citizens' participation for democracy. According to Schlozman et al. (1999), this is 
because political participation contributes to the development of an individual’s sense of political 
efficacy, to the spread of democratic orientations that facilitate cooperation within communities, 
and to making government more responsive to the interests of citizens. For these reasons, studies on 
democratic qualities routinely include participation as a fundamental outcome of investigation (e.g. 
Morlino 2011).  
Several studies examine the link between economic inequality and political participation. In 
particular, Solt's series of articles represents a fundamental contribution to start with: inequality is 
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found to reduce overall levels of engagement and, most importantly from the democratic point of 
view, to enlarge the participatory gap between the rich and the poor, no matter if studied from a 
global comparative perspective (2008), with a special focus on the US (2010), or focusing on 
Europe alone (2015). The contribution of Solt's analyses is fundamental, but there is still room for 
further research. Firstly, his findings are not unanimously confirmed by other authors. For instance, 
Anderson and Beramendi (2008) demonstrate that income inequality significantly lower civic 
participation in 18 OECD democracies, but it does so to a similar degree for both the rich and the 
poor. Secondly, and most importantly, all previous studies do not cover, to our knowledge, a period 
of time that includes the recent economic crisis. This is an important limitation that needs to be 
addressed and this article seeks to do so. On the one hand, we test Solt's findings on the effect of 
economic inequality on an unprecedented dataset created with the first six rounds of the European 
Social Survey (ESS). This allows us to look at a ten-year period of time from 2002 to 2012, thus 
including three rounds before the economic crisis, and three rounds after its outbreak. To our 
knowledge existing research has not yet examined the effect of inequality in periods that include a 
major recession. On the other hand, we also pay attention to the effect of the so-called Great 
Recession itself, both in how it influences participation directly and in how it magnifies or 
diminishes the participation gap between rich and poor. Analyzing the impact of both macro factors 
is particularly important, since predictions about their effects are made with reference to competing 
theoretical perspectives, as we will explain in greater detail below.  
The evidence from our analyses is mixed. On the one hand, Solt's findings about the 
detrimental effect of income inequality are partially confirmed, although our results also show a 
different pattern on one form of political participation which needs further attention. On the other 
hand, the economic downturn apparently counteracts this tendency by fostering the participation of 
the poor and reducing the participation of the rich. 
The article is structured as follows: in the next section, we present in more details the 
relevant literature and the working hypotheses. We do so by distinguishing between two main foci, 
i.e. inequality and crisis, even though we will later show that the same theoretical models are useful 
to interpret empirical patterns related to both. Data and variables are introduced in the third section; 
the empirical analysis will be reported on in the fourth one. The main findings are summarized and 
discussed in the final paragraph.  
 
2. Literature review and working hypotheses 
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2.1 Inequality and participation 
 
Traditionally, studies on economic inequality and political participation pay attention to individual-
level predictors and to their impact on citizens' likelihood to participate. Political participation is 
taken as a costly behavior, associated with undetermined gains and certain costs, in terms of "time 
to take part, money to contribute to campaigns and other political causes, and skills to use time and 
money effectively" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 16). Individuals thus make decisions about 
participating to the political process just as they make decisions to consume any other good. Since 
intellectual and material resources are necessary for engaging in the political process, larger 
amounts of resources are expected to increase the likelihood of engagement (Ansolabehere et al. 
2003, 117-18). Verba and associates cover a broad range of such factors, e.g. social, economic and 
educational resources (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) and family background (Verba, Burns, and 
Schlozman 2003). In similar terms, Marsh and Kaase (1979) show that advantaged citizens are 
more likely to engage in conventional and unconventional forms of participation. Levinson (2012) 
underlines the importance of ethnic and educational backgrounds, while Loose and Jae (2013) 
demonstrate that higher income reduces the opportunity costs of political participation in the US. 
Besides its undisputed merits, this theoretical perspective remains silent about the impact of 
macro-level conditions such as economic inequality on individual participation. The relative power 
theory, as developed by Solt on the basis of Schattschneider's original hypothesis (1960), provides 
the rationale for examining the effect of economic inequality. The point of departure is the 
assumption that money and personal affluence can be used to influence others and to steer political 
decisions. The more concentrated wealth and income are, the more power is in the hands of the rich. 
On this basis, the well-off are expected to prevail more easily in occasionally open conflicts on 
issues regarding their interests in more unequal countries (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Furthermore, 
they manage to prevent some issues to become part of the public debate by excluding them from the 
agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Schattschneider 1960). How does it matter for political 
engagement? If poor people perceive the political system to be incapable to defend their interests, 
they can rationally decide to abandon their engagement in politics (Gaventa 1980; Pateman 1971; 
Schattschneider 1960; Offe 2013). At the same time, also the rich have reduced incentives to 
mobilize politically in defense of their interests, given the withdrawal of the main contenders (and 
their possibility to steer politics by other means). All in all: following Solt's perspective, economic 
inequality is expected to decrease political engagement, albeit with a stronger impact for the poor 
than for the rich (Schattschneider 1960; Uslaner and Brown 2005). Put differently, as inequality 
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increases, the disparity in participation between the rich and the poor will widen. The first goal of 
this article is to test this hypothesis, which includes two distinct statements: 
 
H1) Inequality depresses overall participation and increases the participatory gap between the rich 
and the poor.  
 
Further empirical evidences of such patterns are reported, among others, by Lancee and Werfhortst 
(2012; see also Toth et al. 2014) and Karakoç (2013). However, even though inequality is always 
found to depress participation, its differential effect on the rich and the poor (i.e. its asymmetrical 
impact) is challenged by further studies. On the one hand, Anderson and Beramendi (2008) show 
that inequality significantly lower participation at both ends of the income distribution, thus leaving 
the participatory gap unaltered (equal impact). On the other, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) find that 
inequality encourages engagement for rich individuals (their focus is on campaign contribution) and 
has an opposite effect at the other extreme of the income distribution (symmetrical impact).  
This means we have good reasons to replicate the analyses on a range of outcomes, all the 
more so in order to test the predictive capability of Solt's model in times of economic turmoil. As a 
matter of fact, no studies among those mentioned above include data collected during the ongoing 
crisis, and it is thus important to check whether the relationship between inequality and 
participation still holds under these circumstances.  
 
2.2 Crisis and participation 
 
Our second aim is to assess whether the crisis itself has an impact on citizens' participation. So far 
this question attracted little attention. A notable exception is the study by Kern et al. (2015) who 
test the effects of indicators associated with the economic downturn (first and foremost 
unemployment rates) on changes to participation in Europe. Their main working hypothesis builds 
on the so-called grievance theory, which expects to see higher levels of political animosity and 
participation in response to rising poverty and unemployment. Since 2008, most of European 
countries faced enormous economic problems, in terms of economic contraction and rising 
unemployment rates. When citizens perceive their own situation as falling short of expectations and 
think they don’t get what they deserve, feelings of relative deprivation arise and these, in turn, are 
expected to create a strong incentive for collective action and protest behavior (Gurr 1970, 
Klandermans et al. 2008). Their analysis provides support for this model and indeed it shows that 
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rising unemployment levels encourage specific forms of non-institutionalized participation. Hence, 
our working hypothesis in this respect goes as follows: 
 
H2) The economic crisis encourages political participation. 
 
Notwithstanding its merit, their analysis can be improved. First of all, the authors do not control the 
effect of the crisis for other factors at the country-level. Their dataset includes both democratic and 
non-democratic countries (the Russian Federation) and no control for this and for different 
participation propensities in Eastern and Western Europe is included in their model. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, they do not control for additional economic factors, such as inequality or 
country-specific levels of wellbeingi. Our analysis does so, in order to isolate the actual impact of 
the economic crisis from that of other factors and to gain a more robust assessment of its 
consequences. Second, they principally focus on the main effect of the crisis and present no 
evidence for its contingent effect, i.e. the differential effect of the crisis depending on individual 
economic resources. As economic crises often have more dramatic effects on the poor (cf. Baldacci 
et al 2012), for instance because of cuts to welfare programs on which they disproportionately 
depend, they are likely to feel more deprived than other groups and may thus, following the logic of 
the grievance theory, be more inclined to become politically active than more privileged groups (cf. 
Foster and Matheson 1995). This would lead one to surmise that the greater the economic downturn 
is, the smaller is the difference in political participation between the rich and the poor (or, even 
more spectacularly, the greater is this difference to the benefit of the poor): 
 
H3)  The economic crisis reduces the participatory gap between the rich and the poor.  
 
Thus, while relative power theory expects lower levels of and greater social gaps in participation in 
the more unequal countries, grievance theory anticipates opposite outcomes with respect to the 
economic crisis, i.e. higher levels of and greater equality in participation in the more crisis-afflicted 
countries. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
3.1 Data  
As already mentioned, we focus on democratic European countries. All survey data are drawn from 
the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a biennial, high-quality survey of values, attitudes and 
6 
 
behavior among European populations. More specifically, we create a pooled dataset using the first 
six rounds: this allows us to cover a period of time included between 2002 and 2012, with three 
rounds collected before the economic crisis (2002, 2004 and 2006) and three rounds completed after 
the beginning of the Great Recession (2008, 2010 and 2012). This leaves us 248.741 individuals, 
nested in 130 country-year, nested in 29 different countriesii.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variables 
 
The ESS offers a vast range of indicators on several forms of political participation and some 
descriptive statistics are included in Appendix A. Unsurprisingly, there is a great deal of variation 
across different types of mobilization. Our first dependent variable is electoral participation, which 
is measured with the classic question on whether the respondent has voted or not in the most recent 
elections for the national parliament. Electoral participation is by far the most widely diffused 
across all European populations: with 77.3% of respondents declaring their participation in the last 
national elections, Europe is by and large in line (albeit slightly above) with other countries in the 
world, given the figure provided by Blais (2007, 622-623) of a mean of 75.5%. This data is per se 
quite telling about the resilience of electoral participation as the main channel of political 
engagement and can explain why this form of participation continues to attract most scholarly 
attention (Solt 2008). Previous research has highlighted a plethora of factors influencing voting, 
ranging between individual-level demographic determinants, such as education, income, occupation 
and age, and contextual-level conditions, such as characteristics of the voting system and 
compositional features (for a good review of this research, see Harder and Krosnick 2008). We 
include as many of these influences as control variables in our analyses (see further below).  
ESS respondents are also asked whether or not they have done a specific political action 
(e.g. contacting politicians, signing petitions, working in political parties, and so on; an exhaustive 
list can be found on the ESS official website) during the last 12 months. Although such alternative 
forms of participation are much less common, it is commonly assumed that rising sophistication 
levels change the nature of participation, from traditional and hierarchical to alternative and more 
egalitarian forms (Dalton 2008, Zuckin et al. 2006). Increasing attention should also be placed on 
alternative forms of participation as these may even be more influential than conventional ones in 
terms of their impact on public policies (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 
2004).  For the sake of brevity, we focus on the three most diffused forms of alternative 
participation, i.e. working in organizations, signing petitions and boycotting products. The question 
wording of these items was as follows: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in 
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[country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any 
of the following?” (1) “worked in another organization or association” (i.e. not a political party or 
action group); (2) “signed a petition”; (3) “boycotted certain products”. 
 
3.3 Independent Variables 
 
Three main independent variables are put under scrutiny, i.e. income at the individual level, income 
inequality and a measure of the economic crisis at the macro-level. Since we are firstly interested in 
the role of economic resources at the individual level, we focus on the role of the household's total 
net income. Some economists prefer consumption expenditures instead, since it is more smoothed 
over time and less volatile than income. However, as Brandolini and Smeeding (2011) discuss in 
more details, consumption is preferred in less developed countries, whereas income remains the 
prevalent indicator within rich countries, as it represents the possibility to consume and, as 
measured over a span of a year, a satisfactory measure of material standards of living. The first 
difficulty we had to face was the harmonization of the two income scales provided by the first three 
rounds and the last three rounds of the ESS, i.e. the 12-point fixed scale provided by ESS 1, 2 and 3, 
and the 10-point country-specific scale provided from ESS 4 on. In order to create a comparable 
measure for all rounds, we first identified the category with the median income earner for each 
country; then, we recoded all respondents with income above the median with 1, and the rest with 0. 
Though providing a rough measure of within-country distribution of income, the dummy variable 
allows us to evaluate the impact of earning an income above the median on the propensity to 
participate.  
At the country-year level, we take the Gini index of income inequality as our measure of 
economic inequality. Country- and year-specific values are obtained from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) created by Solt (2016), which is the largest database available 
in this respect.  
Measuring the economic crisis is less straightforward, given its multidimensional nature and 
the many components that one may associate to it. Whereas aforementioned studies address the 
effects of each dimension separately, we developed a synthetic measure of the Recession following 
Kriesi (2014). This measure, which we labeled "Economic Crisis Index" (ECI), is based on the GDP 
growth rate in the year preceding the ESS fieldwork, the budget deficit/surplus in the year before 
the survey, and the unemployment rate of the same year. Similar to the Gini index it has country- 
and year-specific values. High values denote negative GDP growth, large budget deficits and high 
unemployment and thus reflect a severe economic crisis.iii 
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Further control variables are included in the models. First of all, we control for levels of 
economic prosperity (measured by GDP per capita), which is included as a county-year variable. 
Several studies confirm that turnout tends to be higher in economically advanced societies (Blais 
and Dobrzynska 1998; Norris 2002; Fornos, et al. 2004). However, this pattern is confirmed only in 
studies including rich and poor countries, whereas it does not hold in analyses based on countries 
with less variation in affluence, such as Western democracies (Blais 2007). Secondly, post-
communist legacy is also taken as a potentially influential factor. The literature shows that 
participation is systematically lower in post-communist countries (Howard 2003; Bernhard and 
Karakoc 2007; Pacek et al. 2009). We therefore create a dummy variable that distinguishes post-
communist countries from others.  
Several covariates are controlled for also at the individual level. The role of education in 
connection to political participation has been assessed since long by the literature (e.g. Almond and 
Verba, 1963) and its relevance is confirmed over and over (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba 
et al. 1995; Blais 2000). For reasons of parsimony, we regroup the existing categories provided by 
ESS into three different groups, i.e. those with 10 years of education or lower recoded as 1, those 
with 11 to 13 years of education recoded as 2, those with more than 14 years of education recoded 
as 3. By doing so, we create three categories that include approximately 33% of the population 
each. Classically, we expect education to have a positive influence on individual propensity to 
participate.  
Age is the second most significant factor according to some studies (Blais 2000; 2007), 
although its impact may be multifaceted. Whereas younger generations are generally supposed to be 
less interested in political engagement, recent studies suggest that they tend to vote less, but 
participate more through alternative channels, e.g. protest actions (Melo and Stockemer 2014). 
Similarly, gender is expected to matter as well, since existing studies find marked differences 
between males and females in intended political participation (e.g. Hooghe and Stolle 2004). A 
dummy variable on the place of birth is included, as being born in another country most likely 
depresses interest and engagement in the political process (cf. Diehl and Blohm 2001).  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 The impact of economic inequality 
 
As previously mentioned, we work on a hierarchically structured dataset, with individuals (level-1) 
clustered in country-years (level-2), which are in turn clustered in countries (level-3). We also 
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expect political engagement to be shaped both by predictors at the individual level and at the 
country-year level and by interactions between these variables. We therefore estimate a series of 
Multilevel Models (MlM). MLM is appropriate when data are nested, whereas using OLS 
regression on nested data - by means of disaggregating level-2 variables at level-1 - would 
overestimate the effect of macro-level factors (Snijders and Bosker 1999, Hox 2002). We estimate a 
three-level model (of countries, country-years and individuals) rather than a two level one (of 
country-years and individuals) to correct for the bias produced by the non-independence of 
observations concerning years within countries (the same strategy was adopted by Solt in his 
articles and by a number of studies that rely on repeated observations over time; see also Koster and 
Kaminska 2011). Since our dependent variables are binary coded, we estimate Binomial Multilevel 
Models with random effects. The table below reports the coefficients for two models for each form 
of participation: in the first (Model 1), we test the main effects; in the second (Model 2), we 
introduce the interactions of Gini and ECI with individual income. As each of these models includes 
both Gini and ECI, these factors effectively control for one another.iv  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
We start by reporting the main effects of the predictors on the participation outcomes. Model 1 
partially confirms findings from previous studies showing the detrimental impact of income 
inequality on the likelihood to participate. As a rule, inequality decreases the probability to 
participate - of approximately 3-4 points percentagev - , even though its effect is significant only at 
the lowest level of statistical significance.  
What about the gap between the rich and poor in countries with different levels of 
inequality? We address this question by including interaction terms between income inequality and 
household's net income in the model (Model 2), which is the standard approach in studies interested 
in the contingent effect of macro-level variables on individual level resources (e.g. Duch and 
Sagarzuzu 2014; Anderson 2007; Aguinis and Culpepper 2015). On first impression, the interaction 
terms are neither always statistically significant, nor do they all go in the same direction. However, 
their interpretation on the sole basis of their table coefficients is misleading for a number of 
methodological reasons. Among other things, Brambor and his colleagues explain that it is not 
possible to infer whether a certain predictor X has a meaningful conditional effect on Y from the 
magnitude and significance of the interaction term with Z. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible for 
the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively relevant values of the modifying 
variable Z, even if the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant (Brambor et al. 2006). 
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Because of this we take a closer look at the interactions by plotting the interaction terms. In the 
plots below we show how the effect of income on participation varies across different levels of 
inequality. The greater this effect, the larger the gap between the rich and the poor. The plots thus 
allow us to directly address the statement about the participation gap in Hypothesis 1. We follow 
the same strategy for assessing the interaction between economic crisis and income (see Figures 5-8 
further down), thus allowing us to engage with Hypothesis 3. 
 
(Figures 1-4 about here) 
 
As the Figure 1 shows, the effect of income barely changes under different levels of economic 
inequality in the case of voting. If anything, the Gini index contributes to enlarge the participatory 
gap between rich and poor (i.e. the slope is slightly positive), but the effect is not significant and too 
weak to be taken into account. Nevertheless, the other graphs tell a radically different story: on the 
one hand, our expectations are not confirmed by the second interaction, as the divide between the 
rich and the poor significantly decreases alongside rising inequality in the case of working in 
organizations. On the other hand, the disparity-exacerbating effect of inequality is confirmed by the 
other two forms of participation: income inequality widens the gap between the rich and the poor 
for boycotting products and signing a petition. In case of the latter, income does not make a 
difference in the most equal countries but becomes a positive predictor of signing a petition as 
inequality increases. All in all, Solt's findings and our first working hypothesis (H1) are partially 
confirmed: economic inequality tends to depress overall levels of participation and enhances the 
gap between the rich and the poor on some alternative forms of political participation.  
 
4.2 The impact of the economic crisis 
 
The two models address the second issue of the article as well, i.e. testing the main and conditional 
effect of the economic crisis. Following Kern et al. (2015), we control this effect for a number of 
factors, including the main and contingent effects of income inequality. As compared to the 
previous section, one thing seems clear: the economic crisis does not appear to have much of an 
effect on overall participation as its effect is not significant in three out of four cases (see Model 1). 
Rather than fueling or depressing citizens' engagement, the economic crisis seems to have no 
consequences at all at first sight, with the notable exception of voting which is significantly reduced 
by economic downturn. This disconfirms Hypothesis 2 which expected the economic crisis to 
enhance participation.  
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A more careful evaluation is needed concerning the interaction terms in Model 2 and in the 
light of the aforementioned clarification by Brambor and colleagues (2006). Similar to the previous 
section, we plot the interaction terms in order to evaluate whether the effect of income varies under 
different economic performances.  
 
(Figures 5 - 8) 
 
Again, the act of voting seems to be the most immune to contextual influences: the participatory 
gap determined by household income remains stable, no matter if measured in countries hit by the 
crisis (on the right of the figure) or in countries with high-performing economies. On the contrary, 
the same analysis on other forms of participation highlights more variation: once controlled for all 
other economic factors, the effect of income on the propensity to be part of an organization drops as 
the economic crisis becomes more severe. Even more interestingly, the effect of income on the 
propensity of boycotting products is apparently not significant when the economy fares well - or 
barely significant in the case of signing petitions. In both cases, the effect becomes more evidently 
significant and negative under poor performances. This means that the worse-off are comparatively 
more active than the rich when the crisis hits hard, which is coherent with expectations based on the 
grievance theory discussed above.  
 
4.3. The impact of the control variables 
 
In terms of the control variables, economic prosperity, the other variable measured at the year-
country level, has little influence on participation, which is consistent with Blais' argument (2007) 
that no significant difference exists among countries with relatively little variation in affluence. If 
anything, economic wellbeing reduces traditional voting but encourages membership in 
organizations. A very different story is reported by the dummy on post-communist countries, as the 
analysis confirms the previous findings on the persistent divide between Eastern and Western 
European countries in individual propensity to engage politically (Howard 2003, Bernhard and 
Karakoc 2007, Pacek et al, 2009). In general, Western Europeans are approximately 4 to 5 
percentage points more likely to be active than Eastern Europeans in all forms of participation 
under scrutiny.  
Interesting findings emerge among control variables at the individual level too. 
Unsurprisingly, being born in another country heavily decreases the likelihood to be politically 
active. Besides the strong effect registered for educationvi, the most interesting insights pertain the 
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role of gender and age. More specifically, the analysis sheds light on the different propensities to 
participate of males and females: whereas males significantly vote more and work more in 
organizations, females are more active both in the case of boycotting products and signing petitions, 
even though the difference in both cases is around 1 point percentage. Similarly, the role of age 
needs some refinement, as suggested by recent studies (e.g. Melo and Stockemer 2014). Younger 
generations work less in associations; however, they are significantly more active in signing 
petitions (up to two points percentage, if we compare respondents in their 20s and respondents in 
their 70s). Finally, the role of economic resources at the individual level is confirmed for all forms 
of participation. The coefficients in Model 1 show that belonging to the part of the population that 
earns an income above the median change the probability to be active, but it accounts for an average 
difference estimated between 1 and 2 points percentage in the three forms of participation under 
scrutiny. This confirms that other predictors at the individual level are more important in 
determining the likelihood of political engagement, first and foremost education, given the gap of 
approximately 5 percentage points between the most and the least educated for all forms of 
participation.  
 
 
5. Summary and discussion 
 
To say it with Lijphart (1997), if democracy is at its core associated with the ideal of political 
equality, how does it cope with a reality of unequal participation which, in turn, is likely to lead to 
an unequal influence over the outcome of the democratic decision-making process? To be sure, the 
concept of political equality is complicated and discussing it is well beyond the scope of this article. 
Measuring political inequality entails different and complementary strategies, broadly distinguished 
between those that focus on the input side and those focusing on the output side (Dubrow 2014). In 
other words, inequality can be assessed either in terms of unequal political input of certain groups in 
the decision-making process, or in terms of the differential effects of political decisions on different 
social groups. Focusing on citizens' participation clearly belongs to the former strategy and it moves 
from the idea that even if the choice of non-participation at the individual level is perfectly 
compatible with the framework of liberal democracy, recurring statistical patterns raise an issue of 
underrepresentation of certain groups' interests. As Offe puts it, the problem arises when patterns of 
uneven under-utilization of political resources exist: "here non-participation is evidently not freely 
chosen, or it is freely chosen as the conditions that are statistically correlated with this choice are 
themselves not freely chosen, but conditional on circumstances that are beyond the control of those 
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affected by them" (2013, 203). In view of this observation, the current article examined whether 
within-country distribution of participation varies under different macro-economic circumstances. 
Our analysis offers a twofold contribution to the literature. On the one hand, it tests existing 
findings on the impact of economic disparities. More specifically, Solt's comprehensive studies on 
the role of income inequality (2008, 2010, 2015) are replicated on European data and his findings 
are by and large confirmed, even if tested in times of economic turmoil. Income inequality 
generally reduces overall participation - though its effect is not statistically significant on all forms 
of participation - and, most importantly, increases the gap between better- and worse-off in three 
forms of participation out of four (minimally for voting and significantly for signing petitions and 
boycotting products). Interestingly enough, inequality mitigates the income gap in the case of 
working in organizations. This is because inequality has depressed overall levels of this form of 
participation to such an extent that there is relatively little variation in this outcome in the most 
unequal countries, and apparently too little for income to have an effect.vii Why there is so little 
variation in working in organizations in more unequal countries is a question for further research. 
On the other hand, the analysis shows that the crisis has no major effect on the propensity to 
engage, but it does influence the within-country distribution of active citizens. In the case of voting 
and working in organizations, the income-based divide is mitigated by the crisis; in the case of 
boycotting products and signing petitions the worse-off are relatively more active than the rich in 
countries having suffered most from the crisis.  
These findings have some theoretical implications as well. Whereas the relative power 
theory confirms its predictive capability concerning the effects of economic disparities, the 
grievance model has good explanatory power regarding the effect of economic crises on the 
political participation of different income groups. This is particularly true for alternative forms of 
participation. Findings by Kern et al. (2015) are thus confirmed, even if controlled for all factors 
that were not included in the previous studies. Similar to their study, our results suggest that both 
theoretical approaches presented in this article (i.e. the relative power theory and the grievance 
theory) can help to assess participatory tendencies, especially if these are tested in times of 
economic turmoil.  
Why do income inequality and the economic crisis have such contrasting effects on the link 
between income and political participation and thereby confirm such conflicting theories? We can 
only speculate about the reasons here. Possibly the diverging effects have to do with the different 
pace at which the two macro-economic processes operate. While inequality is changing slowly and 
is taking decades to become notably larger or smaller, an economic crisis can occur suddenly and 
upset seemingly healthy growth trajectories (as happened in Greece). Perhaps the relative inertia of 
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inequality gives rise to a sentiment that not much can be done about it, which in turn might fuel 
political disengagement and alienation amongst the poor. In contrast, the immediacy of an 
economic crisis and the acute sense of loss experienced by those most affected by it might incite 
people to act in an effort to regain what was lost (as illustrated by the mass demonstrations in 
Greece in the aftermath of the crisis). In other words, while inequality might undermine a sense of 
external political efficacy, economic crises could well enhance it. This is a question for future 
research to explore. 
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Table 1 – The determinants of political participation (coefficients from multilevel binomial 
regressions) 
 Vote Working in org Boycott Sign petition 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
         
Income .037
*** 
(.002) 
.035*** 
(.012) 
.021*** 
(.001) 
.048*** 
(.010) 
.011*** 
(.001) 
-.015 
(.011) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
-.026 
(.012) 
Gini -.004
* 
(.002) 
-.004* 
(.002) 
-.005* 
(.002) 
-.004* 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.004* 
(.002) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
ECI -.001
** 
(.000) 
-.001** 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
-.0005 
(.0004) 
-.0004 
(.0004) 
Gini*income 
 
.0001 
(.000) 
 
-.001** 
(.000)  
.001** 
(.000)  
.001** 
(.000) 
ECI*income 
 
-.000 
(.002) 
 
-.0002* 
(.0001)  
-.0005*** 
(.0001)  
-.0002 
(.0001) 
Individual controls         
Most 
educated 
.151*** 
(.002) 
.151*** 
(.002) 
.111*** 
(.002) 
.111*** 
(.002) 
.141*** 
(.002) 
.141*** 
(.002) 
.159*** 
(.002) 
.159*** 
(.002) 
Medium 
educated 
.069*** 
(.002) 
.069*** 
(.002) 
.038*** 
(.002) 
.038*** 
(.002) 
.048*** 
(.002) 
.048*** 
(.002) 
.061*** 
(.002) 
.060*** 
(.002) 
Gender 
(female) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
-.007* 
(.002) 
-.040*** 
(.001) 
-.040*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.021*** 
(.002) 
.021*** 
(.002) 
Age .005
*** 
(.000) 
.005*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.000) 
Born in 
another 
country 
-.183*** 
(.003) 
-.183*** 
(.003) 
-.049*** 
(.002) 
-.049*** 
(.002) 
-.033*** 
(.003) 
-.033*** 
(.003) 
-.071*** 
(.003) 
-.071*** 
(.003) 
Country-year 
controls 
        
GDP per 
capita 
-.0005* 
(.0002) 
-.0005* 
(.0002) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.0003) 
.0004 
(.0003) 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
Country controls         
Post-
communism 
-.129*** 
(.026) 
-.129*** 
(.026) 
-.106*** 
(.029) 
-.106*** 
(.029) 
-.108* 
(.031) 
-.108* 
(.031) 
-.150** 
(.039) 
-.150** 
(.039) 
Intercept .604
*** 
(.062) 
.605*** 
(.063) 
.207*** 
(.062) 
.193** 
(.062) 
.182** 
(.065) 
.196** 
(.065) 
.392*** 
(.078) 
.409*** 
(.078) 
Variance components        
Residuals .391 .391 .335 .335 .348 .348 .393 .393 
Country-
year 
.059 .059 .067 .067 .071 .071 .092 .092 
Countries .028 .028 .026 .026 .027 .027 .032 .032 
  
   
 
 
 
 
N level-1 248,741 248,741 248,741 248,741 248,741 248,741 248,741 248,741 
N level-2 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 
N level-3 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
AIC 217919 217767 160040 160062 178910 178928 238959 238985 
* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1 - Marginal effect of income on voting conditional on the level of income inequality 
 
 
Figure 2 - Marginal effect of income on working in organizations conditional on the level of 
income inequality 
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Figure 3 - Marginal effect of income on boycotting products conditional on the level of income 
inequality 
 
Figure 4 - Marginal effect of income on signing petitions conditional on the level of income 
inequality 
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Figure 5 - Marginal effect of income on voting conditional on the economic crisis 
 
 
Figure 6 - Marginal effect of income on working in organizations conditional on the economic 
crisis 
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Figure 7 - Marginal effect of income on boycotting products conditional on the economic crisis 
 
Figure 8 - Marginal effect of income on signing petitions conditional on the economic crisis 
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i Taking into consideration only the GDP per capita annual growth (%) without controlling it for the overall level of 
wellbeing (e.g. GDP per capita itself) overestimates the economic conditions of some fast developing countries (e.g. 
Estonia) as compared to rich ones (e.g. (e.g. Finland). 
ii Differently from Kern et al. (2015), we exclude those countries that are rated either as not free or partly free by 
Freedom House, i.e. Albania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Kosovo. The reason for this is that participating to political 
affairs may acquire a totally different meaning in full democracies and in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. 
Furthermore, we must exclude from the analysis all those countries where the ESS question on income is not included 
(Bulgaria 2008, Estonia 2004 and 2006, Cyprus 2006 and 2008, Hungary 2002 and 2006, France 2002, Ireland 2002, 
Portugal 2010 and Slovakia 2008).  
iii Economic Crisis Index = GDP Growth - Unemployment + Deficit-Surplus. For the sake of clarity, we then reverse the 
scale, so that higher scores correspond to more severe economic hardship. We created the measure by first standardising 
the three variables that it includes and then by subtracting gdp growth from the sum of budget deficit and 
unemployment rate. 
iv Although we have not found any theoretical leads in the literature to suggest that austerity might influence whether 
income inequality enhances or mitigates the participation gap between the rich and poor, we nonetheless checked for 
this possibility by running a model with a three-way interaction between economic crisis, income inequality and 
individual income and a two-way interaction between economic crisis and income inequality. The effects of these 
interactions turned out to be insignificant (results can be obtained from the authors upon request). Hence we only report 
the results of the more parsimonious models (i.e. Models 1 and 2). 
v We are referring here to the predicted probabilities computed on the basis of the regression coefficients. In Binomial 
Multilevel Models, the coefficient β associated to each Xn is the effect of a unit increment of X on the logit scale (i.e. 
log-odds, or the natural logarithm of the odds determining the probability of a certain outcome Y associated to X). The 
probabilities are computed by assigning different scores for the variable under scrutiny, holding all other variables 
constant at their mean value and dummy variables at 1 (for more on predicted probabilities, please see Afshartous and 
de Leeuw 2005; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009). 
  
vi Three meaningful categories are built on the basis of the years of full-time education completed in order to include 
approximately 30% of the respondents in each.   
vii A table showing the variation in the four outcomes across different levels of inequality and economic crisis can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
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